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Converting Hospitals from 
No  t-for-Profit to For-Profit Status 
Why and What Effects? 
David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
The vast majority of American hospitals are organized as charitable, not- 
for-profit corporations. The public does not own them. Instead, they are 
private corporations organized to pursue a community health care mis- 
sion. Their corporate and tax statuses rest on a combination of statutory 
provisions and revenue service definitions. While many aspects of their 
organization and regulation distinguish them from for-profit corporations, 
the fundamental distinction is their purpose to further charitable hospital 
goals rather than to maximize owners' wealth. 
Between  1970 and 1995, 330 (about 7 percent) out of  approximately 
5,000 not-for-profit hospitals have converted to for-profit corporate form, 
including a dramatic number in just the past few years. Despite these large 
changes, there has been almost no empirical research on the reasons for 
and the effects of conversions.' This paper offers a preliminary exploration 
of the causes and effects of conversions. Throughout the paper, we  focus 
on two case studies: Wesley Medical Center in Wichita, Kansas, and the 
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1. There has also been little work comparing conversions in the hospital industry to con- 
versions in other medical care industries, such as insurance or physician services, or in other 
industries outside of the medical sector, such as public utilities. This is a worthy topic for 
future research. 
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ColumbidHealthOne system in  Denver, Colorado.2 These two conver- 
sions interested us for many reasons. Wesley Medical Center and Colum- 
bia/HealthOne are both large, stable hospitals. As of 1995, Wesley, which 
employed over 3,000 people, was the fifteenth largest for-profit hospital in 
the United  States, and measured by  revenues, it was  Columbia/HCA's 
largest hospital. In addition, Healthone recently entered into a joint ven- 
ture limited liability company (LLC) with ColumbidHCA, providing a 
good example of an increasingly popular corporate form. Because both 
hospitals initially converted over a decade ago, they offered long histories 
for study. The very factors that attracted us, however, also make the experi- 
ence of the hospitals somewhat less generalizable.  As we discuss below, the 
typical converting hospital is small and financially weak. Therefore, the 
motivations for these conversions are more complicated and subtle than 
those of the ordinary conversion. 
The data in this paper are drawn from several sources, including inter- 
views, Medicare cost reports, legal documents, and newspaper articles. In 
the course of our research we  visited both hospitals to interview people 
familiar with and employed by the sellers, the buyers, the resulting founda- 
tions, and the government. Because many details of hospital transactions 
are confidential, the numbers and deal structures reported below are all 
derived from public sources. Of course, public sources may not be com- 
pletely accurate, and several people we  interviewed expressed displeasure 
with public reporting of the transactions involved; still, the public record 
is often the only one available. 
Our case studies suggest two principal factors driving hospital conver- 
sions. The first is financial considerations. While profits are certainly im- 
portant, financial considerations are not limited to concerns about profit- 
ability. Having a large debt load and gaining access to cheaper sources of 
capital are also important in the conversion decision. Second, we find that 
the culture of the not-for-profit hospital influences the conversion deci- 
sion. Both of our case study institutions had boards of directors consisting 
primarily of businessmen, many of whom believed they were ill-trained to 
run a major hospital. Businessmen may also be more tolerant of the for- 
profit ownership form than people with a more religious or not-for-profit 
orientation. 
Our evidence on the effects of for-profit and not-for-profit ownership is 
subtle. Looking at financial measures of hospital performance, we  find 
that for-profit hospitals, particularly those run by  ColumbidHCA, were 
more financially successful than not-for-profit hospitals. In part, this suc- 
cess derives from the for-profits' skill at increasing public sector reim- 
2. Columbia-Healthone operates six general hospitals (PresbyteriadSt. Luke's Medical 
Center, Swedish Medical Center, Aurora Presbyterian Medical Center, Rose Medical Center, 
Aurora Regional Medical Center, and North Suburban Medical Center). In addition,  it oper- 
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bursements; in part it is because for-profit hospitals cut costs where not- 
for-profit hospitals do not. But perhaps most important, not-for-profit 
hospitals appear to follow for-profit hospitals in the same behavior. A few 
years after for-profit hospitals exploit Medicare loopholes, not-for-profit 
hospitals do the same. This pattern has troubling implications as for-profit 
hospitals become an increasingly large player in the medical care envi- 
ronment. 
We  are not able to examine the quality of  hospital care in  any detail. 
Determining hospital quality requires accurate measures of patient out- 
comes and adjustments for the health of patients across institutions. Nei- 
ther of  these measures is available to us. Examining the implications of 
conversions for hospital quality is an important issue for future research. 
We begin by defining terms, describing some mechanisms by which hos- 
pitals convert, and detailing the transactions of the two case hospitals. In 
section 2.2, we  present trends in the number of conversions over time. 
In section 2.3, we  report and analyze the reasons commonly offered for 
conversions. In section 2.4, we present two case studies of converted hospi- 
tals, examining why  they converted and how the conversions affected the 
hospitals and their markets. Finally, in section 2.5, we  offer concluding 
thoughts. 
2.1 
The term “conversion,” for the purposes of this paper, is any mechanism 
by which a hospital changes its essential orientation from not-for-profit to 
for-profit or vice versa.3  State law dictates which of many possible mecha- 
nisms charitable, not-for-profit hospitals may use to convert to for-profit 
corporate form. To convert in some states, a not-for-profit hospital may 
simply file amended articles of incorporation and bylaws with the state 
secretary or corporations commission. Most conversions, however, involve 
more than one party. Asset sales, in which the buyer takes all of the seller’s 
assets and only the liabilities specifically contracted for in the sales docu- 
ment, are typical in conversion transactions because buyers are often not 
permitted to buy some not-for-profit liabilities such as tax-exempt debt. 
In this type of transaction, a for-profit pays money to a not-for-profit hos- 
pital and subsequently owns the hospital and its assets. The not-for-profit 
hospital generally uses the proceeds from the asset sale to buy back out- 
standing debt, with remaining amounts directed to other charitable pur- 
poses. 
Acquisitions, mergers, corporate restructurings that transfer not-for- 
The Mechanics of Hospital Conversions 
3. The term  “conversion” has also been used to describe privatizations, the process by 
which a public hospital becomes private or a private hospital becomes public. This paper 
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profit assets to for-profit subsidiaries, consolidations, lease agreements, 
and various forms of joint ventures between for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals have all been used to convert hospitals. Some of these transac- 
tions, particularly joint ventures, involve ongoing relationships between 
not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals. A joint venture may involve as little 
integration as joint marketing of a new service or as much integration as 
a partnership that looks to the outside world like a single corporation. In 
some, control is shared between the two entities; in others, one hospital 
effectively controls the  other  by  dominating the  subordinate hospital’s 
board or operating the majority of the subordinate’s assets. Joint ventures 
and asset sales may also differ in their tax implications; for example, pas- 
sive income to a not-for-profit corporation may be taxed as unrelated in- 
come, while for-profit gifts to a not-for-profit are tax deductible. 
According to federal tax law, not-for-profit assets may not be used for 
profit-making purposes. Thus, when  not-for-profit hospitals convert to 
for-profit status, the proceeds must be directed toward another not-for- 
profit activity; they cannot benefit private individuals or for-profit buyers. 
If the IRS finds that a transaction involved private inurement, it may force 
the unwinding of  a deal and impose stiff  penalties on the participating 
institutions and individuals. State corporations codes generally dictate the 
use  of  charitable assets when  a not-for-profit corporation merges,  dis- 
solves, or transforms itself in  some other way.  Statutes typically require 
that assets be used for purposes similar to those of the selling entity. Foun- 
dations established with conversion proceeds must, therefore, pursue com- 
munity goals similar to those specified by the converting hospital’s charter 
(e.g., community-based health care). 
How similar the old and new purposes must be varies according to state 
corporations and trust laws. Not-for-profit hospitals frequently solicit con- 
tributions for particular purposes and receive funds with explicit and im- 
plicit restrictions upon their use. When hospitals convert they often are 
no longer able to comply with these restrictions. Judicial authorization, 
through a cy pres proceeding, is required for a new foundation to use the 
restricted funds.4  A judge must find that the settlor5  had a broad charitable 
intent, that the previous use has “become obsolete or impossible or im- 
practicable of execution due to changes in social, economic, political or 
other conditions,”6 and that the new use is as near as possible to the in- 
tended use. Under some state laws, this test applies not only to formal re- 
stricted trusts but also to all charitable donations and, in very restrictive 
states, even to the charitable corporation itself. In states that have adopted 
the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, donors may permit 
4. Cy pres comes from the French “cypres  commepossible,” meaning “as near as possible.” 
5. A person who creates a trust. 
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a change in the use  of institutional  funds or the court may  order the 
change under an analysis similar to the cy pres analysis. 
State attorneys general are frequently the only government actors who 
interpret and apply restrictions on conversions and the proceeds they gen- 
erate; consequently, the rigor with which statutes are applied, or whether 
they are applied at all, varies dramatically by  state (Horwitz 1998). The 
public has an interest in ensuring adequate oversight of conversions and 
their proceeds for many reasons. The public allows not-for-profit hospitals 
to have tax exemptions because it wishes the hospital to perform desirable 
public services. Thus, the public has an interest in ensuring that the bene- 
fits of those exemptions are not appropriated by  a for-profit buyer. Con- 
versions may also represent redistributive losses to the extent that  for- 
profits do not provide services that not-for-profits formerly did (such as 
uncompensated medical care); the public sector may want to minimize the 
extent of these losses (Horwitz 1998). 
To illustrate the nature of hospital conversions, we  discuss the details of 
the conversions for our two case-study institutions. 
2.1.1  Wesley Medical Center 
The Wesley Medical Center sale was relatively straightforward. (Fig. 2.1 
shows the conversion graphically.) In 1985, Wesley’s assets were  sold to 
the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), at the time one of the largest 
for-profit hospital companies in the United States. Wesley had 786 beds,7 
making it Kansas’s second-largest hospital (behind a Veterans Adminis- 
tration hospital) and the largest hospital to have converted from not-for- 
profit to for-profit corporate status at that time. HCA paid approximately 
$265 million for the operating assets, including $40 million earmarked 
to defease outstanding debt. After the debt defeasance, the net proceeds 
were roughly $225 million. In 1993, HCA merged with Columbia Hospital 
Corporation, becoming Columbia/HCA, and Wesley changed its name to 
Columbia Wesley Medical Center. In 1997, as Columbia/HCA faced wide- 
spread negative publicity, Wesley  dropped “Columbia” from its appella- 
tion. 
In the Wesley case, the use of the $225 million proceeds from the sale 
was somewhat complicated. Wesley was founded by and affiliated with the 
Methodist Church, and there was considerable controversy regarding the 
role of  the church in the sale. Whether the church held formal decision- 
making  authority regarding the  sale was  never resolved, although  the 
members of the Methodist Kansas West Annual Conference, the govern- 
ing body for Methodist churches in Kansas, voted to support it. In the 
final agreement, the church received about 12 percent (approximately $32 
7. All statistics on number of hospital beds in the paper refer to staffed beds. Hospitals 
may also have licensed beds that are not staffed. 50  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
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Fig. 2.1  The Wesley Hospital sale 
million of the $265 million deal) of the original sale over three years. Thus, 
two foundations were funded: the Kansas Health Foundation,s with the 
bulk of the money from the Wesley  sale (about $200 million); and the 
United Methodist Health Ministry Fund, with the payments to the Meth- 
odist Church. In 1996, the Kansas Health Foundation reported assets of 
$377 million. 
2.1.2  Columbia-Healthone 
Our second case study is the Columbia-Healthone hospital system in 
Denver, Colorado. In 1995, the system was Colorado’s third-largest pi- 
vate employer (10,000 people) and had estimated annual revenues of $1.2 
billion. Healthone has a much more complicated history of transaction 
activity. (Figs. 2.2A, 2.2B, and 2.2C detail the ownership activities.) The 
forerunners to Healthone were Presbyterian Hospital (sponsored by  the 
Presbytery of Denver) and St. Luke’s Hospital (sponsored by the Episco- 
pal Diocese of Colorado), which merged in 1979 to form PSL Healthcare 
Corporation.  In  1985, PSL Healthcare  Corporation sold its assets to 
AMI-a  for-profit hospital company-for  $173 mil!ion.  At the time, Pres- 
8. The Kansas Health Foundation is the descendant of the foundation previously associ- 
ated with the medical center, the Wesley Foundation. Restrictions on funds held by  that 
foundation before the conversion were released in state court under  the Kansas Uniform 
Management  of Institutional Funds  Act (K.S.A. @58-3607 (1996)). Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status  51 
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Fig. 2.2A  The Healthone mergers: AM1 
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Fig. 2.2B  The Healthone mergers: Reconversion and establishment of Healthone 
byterian Hospital had 385 beds and St. Luke's Hospital had 284 beds, so 
that the total institution  had  669 beds. After paying off  approximately 
$45 million of  outstanding debt and other obligations, PSL Healthcare 
Corporation was left with roughly $123 million. Subsequent settlements 
of outstanding Medicare claims and other closing adjustments brought 
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Fig. 2.2C  The Healthone mergers: The joint venture with Columbia/HCA 
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This sum was used to establish the Colorado Trust, the state’s second- 
largest private foundation. The Colorado Trust’s mission is “to promote 
the health and well-being of the people in Colorado through programs for 
affordable and accessible health care and the strengthening of families.” 
The seller imposed two restrictions on the Trust: (I) that it support med- 
ical research and education, and (2) that it distribute an amount equal to 
10 percent of the preceding year’s grants to the Episcopal Diocese of Colo- 
rado and  the Presbytery of Denver. In  addition,  the selling board was 
concerned about health care access for the poor. As a condition to the 
sale, AM1 promised to maintain then-current levels of indigent care. 
By  1991, AM1 encountered financial trouble because of the high debt it 
incurred from a leveraged buyout. AM1 suspended construction on a par- 
tially completed tower  at the PresbyteriadSt.  Luke’s  hospital complex. 
Disturbed  by  the hard  luck that befell the hospital, doctors and other 
community members established a not-for-profit hospital  corporation, 
PSL Healthcare Systems (PSL), to purchase the Colorado assets of AMI.9 
Columbia Rose 
Hospital 
9. These assets included Presbyterian hospital, St. Luke’s Hospital, and Aurora Presbyte- 
rian Hospital, among other assets. 
Other Medical 
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Because the new not-for-profit would undertake medical research and ed- 
ucation, the Colorado Trust decided that aiding PSL in purchasing AMI's 
Colorado assets would fulfill its obligation to support medical research 
and education. Therefore, the Colorado Trust granted $30 million and lent 
$30 million to PSL for the purchase. With these sources and an additional 
$216.7 million borrowed from other sources, PSL purchased AMI's Colo- 
rado assets and made other investments.'O  The hospital again became a 
not-for-profit institution.  In  1993, PSL merged  with Swedish Hospital, 
another not-for-profit hospital in Denver. Shortly thereafter, the name of 
the combined institution was changed to Healthone. The asset value of 
Healthone was about $550 million in  1995," although Healthone had 
outstanding debt of about $350 million, for a net value of $200 million. 
Facing such a large debt burden, Healthone once again chose corporate 
organizational change as the answer to its problems. In searching for a 
merger partner, Healthone identified Columbia/HCA as the only candi- 
date willing to act quickly. ColumbidHCA already owned two hospitals 
in the Denver area (North Suburban Hospital and Aurora Regional Hos- 
pital), as well  as a number of medical clinics, surgery centers, and other 
medical services. These assets were worth about $180 million. In addition, 
Columbia was in the process of purchasing a third hospital, Rose Hospital 
(long affiliated with the Jewish community), which had  assets of  about 
$220 million and debt of about $70 million, for a net value of $150 million. 
Rather  than  an  outright  sale,  Columbia  and  Healthone formed  a 
joint venture. The joint venture is  a for-profit holding company, named 
Columbia-Healthone LLC.12 The assets of the joint venture include Co- 
lumbia's two existing hospitals and its outpatient facilities, and the hospi- 
tals in Healthone. To equalize the ownership of the joint venture, Colum- 
bia/HCA loaned  Healthone approximately $350 million to defease its 
outstanding debt. The loan was assumed by the LLC, however, so Health- 
One's share of the repayment is small. In addition, ColumbidHCA con- 
tributed $10-$20  million to the Healthone Foundation. After the contri- 
butions, ColumbiaIHCA and Healthone had roughly the same net asset 
values (about $180 million each), so the two are equal partners in the joint 
venture. Columbia, through an exclusive management contract with the 
joint venture, controls the day-to-day operations at the facilities. 
10. About $100 million was paid to AM1 for the Colorado assets. Most of  the remainder 
was used to complete construction on the patient tower. 
11. By  this point, Healthone included the above mentioned hospitals and several out- 
patient facilities. 
12. A limited liability company is a hybrid of  a partnership and a business corporation. 
Like a partnership, profits and losses flow to the members of the company through distribu- 
tions. Unlike most partnerships,  however, members of  limited liability companies benefit 
from some of the protections against personal liability afforded to employees of business 
corporations. Bankruptcy, death, dissolution, expulsion, resignation, or withdrawal of any 
member of the LLC usually leads to automatic dissolution of the company. 54  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
In addition to its assets, the joint venture leases Columbia Rose Hospi- 
tal for a 99-year term. Since Columbia owns Rose Hospital, the lease pay- 
ments of approximately $19 million per year are made to Columbia, but 
the leasing arrangement preserved the equal ownership of the joint ven- 
ture ownership. 
The claims on the joint venture are therefore at least threefold: (1) some 
of the money generated goes to Columbia/HCA to repay the loan it ex- 
tended to Healthone; (2) some of the money is paid to Columbia/HCA 
for the Rose lease; and (3) the remaining profits of the joint venture are 
split equally between Columbia/HCA and Healthone for the equity role 
in the joint venture. In  1996, the interest payments to Columbia/HCA 
were reported to be about $60 million; the lease payments to Columbia/ 
HCA for Rose Hospital were reported to be $19 million; and profits were 
reported to be $19 million. Healthone’s 50 percent interest in the LLC 
includes representation on the board equal to that of Columbia, thus en- 
suring Healthone’s veto power over Columbia decisions. 
Healthone now  concentrates on graduate medical education. It pays 
the  faculty  and  residents  and  administers  medical  education  at 
Healthone-Columbia facilities. 
2.2  The Magnitude of Hospital Conversions 
To understand  the magnitude of hospital conversions nationwide, we 
examine the trend of conversions over the past 25 years. We focus on con- 
versions of general medical and surgical institutions. There are a variety 
of other types of hospitals-rehabilitation,  children’s, cancer, tuberculosis, 
and so forth-that  may also change organizational form, but our interest 
is in the nearly 5,000 general hospitals that form the bulk of the U.S. hos- 
pital system. We also focus on private, not-for-profit institutions. Federal, 
and particularly state and local, hospitals may become private and/or for- 
profit corporations, but their motives to convert to for-profit status may 
be very different from those of a private hospital. 
Figure 2.3 shows the number of  private, not-for-profit hospitals con- 
verting to for-profit status between 1970 and 1995. Our data are from the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) annual surveys, compilations of 
self-reported information by  hospitals. We  find conversions by matching 
hospitals in successive years of the survey and determining which hospi- 
tals moved from not-for-profit to for-profit contr01.’~  Between 1970 and 
1984 our data are biannual; we  assign half  of the two-year change to 
each year. 
The number of conversions was low in the 1970s-about  5-10  per year. 
As table 2.1 shows, the hospitals that converted were relatively small; 52 
13. This method omits hospitals that changed their AHA identification number at the time 









Fig. 2.3  Hospital conversions from not-for-profit to for-profit status, 1970-95 
Note: Data prior to 1984 are averages over a two-year period. 




Total Conversions by Time Period 
Number of Beds  1980  1970-80  1980-87  1987-91  1991-94  1994-95 
All hospitals  4,991  67  137  34  47  44 
< 25 beds (“YO)  4  3  8  0  2  0 
2549  beds (“YO)  18  21  15  38  15  9 
50-99  beds (%)  24  33  29  26  30  9 
200-399  beds (%)  20  10  13  15  19  34 
2  400 beds (%)  11  1  1  3  4  11 
100-199  beds (%)  22  31  34  18  30  36 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on American Hospital Association annual survey. 
percent of the hospitals that converted to for-profit status had fewer than 
100 beds, compared to 46 percent of hospitals as a whole. Only 1 percent 
of the largest hospitals converted to for-profit status, well below their 11 
percent share of total hospitals. 
In the early and, particularly, mid-l980s, conversion activity increased. 
There were 29 conversions in 1986 alone. Informal conversations we  have 
had with  hospital executives suggest that financial concerns drove the 
merger activity in  this period. When the Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) for Medicare was implemented in fiscal year 1984, for example, hos- 
pital executives worried that their revenues would fall. Industry wisdom 
also predicted that for-profit medical care would gain in importance, and 
many hospitals were eager to be in the vanguard of this trend. 
By 1988, the Prospective Payment System proved to be less damaging 56  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
to revenues than previously feared. The remaining not-for-profit hospi- 
tals were likely more committed to the not-for-profit organizational form. 
As a result, conversion activity slowed; between 1988 and 1991 there were 
only 8 or 10 conversions each year. 
In the  1990s, and particularly in very  recent years, conversions have 
again increased. There were between 12 and  18 conversions per year up 
through 1994, and an overwhelming 44 conversions in 1995. 
Further, the type of hospital converting from not-for-profit to for-profit 
status has changed markedly over time. This change is most noticeable in 
the size of the institution. About one-quarter of the converting hospitals 
in the 1991-94  period had over 200 beds, as did nearly one-half of  the 
converting hospitals in 1994-95.  Hospitals with over 200 beds accounted 
for only about 15 percent of conversions in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
There are also clear regional patterns to hospital conversions, as shown 
in table 2.2. Conversion activity is most prominent in the Southern Atlan- 
tic states (principally Florida) and the West South Central states (princi- 
pally Texas), both ColumbidHCA strongholds. Despite having only one- 
quarter of  the nation’s hospitals in  1980, these two regions account for 
about one-half of the conversions in each time period. Hospitals in the 
Pacific region (largely California) are also overrepresented in conversions. 
There has been very little conversion activity in the Northeast or Middle 
Atlantic, however. In our sample, there were only 4 conversions in the en- 
tire 25-year period in those states, despite the fact that they accounted for 
13 percent of the hospitals in 1980. The relative lack of conversions in the 
Northeast  and  Middle  Atlantic  regions  likely  reflects  several factors: 
tighter regulation in those states; smaller managed care enrollment; and a 
sense that the hospital industry is substantially overbuilt in those areas. 
Table 2.2  Conversions by Region 
Region 
~~~~~~~  ~ 
Private, 
Not-for-Profit  Share of 
Hospitals,  Conversions, 
1980  1970-95 
All 
Northeast (YO) 
Middle Atlantic (%) 
South Atlantic (YO) 
East North Central (“YO) 
East South Central (“/a) 
West North Central (YO) 























~~~~  ~ 
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2.3  Why Are Hospitals Converting? 
To date there has been no empirical examination regarding why  hos- 
pitals increasingly prefer the for-profit over the not-for-profit corporate 
form. One explanation for conversions is generic: Recent years have seen 
many more hospital mergers in general, and thus we  would expect more 
conversions of hospitals from not-for-profit to for-profit status. Of course, 
this raises the question of why there have been so many hospital mergers. 
Rather than citing simply “increased merger activity,” we instead consider 
the changes in the medical care marketplace that might drive such behav- 
ior. We focus on six explanations for hospital conversions. 
2.3.1  Financial Status 
Perhaps the most commonly mentioned factor in hospital conversions 
is the financial status of the converting hospitals. There are several related 
financial reasons that motivate not-for-profit hospitals to sell to or partner 
with for-profit institutions. These include access to capital, current or ex- 
pected profit reductions, and relief from debt burden. 
Access to Capital 
The most commonly identified reason for conversions is the need to 
obtain capital, for operations and capital expenditures such as new equip- 
ment and buildings. While there are many permutations of the capital- 
needs argument, all boil down to an inadequate access to capital for neces- 
sary expenditures. First, many not-for-profits face absolute limits on ac- 
cessing capital. Although not-for-profit corporations have access to forms 
of  capital that are unavailable to for-profits-tax-deductible  donations 
and tax-exempt debt-both  sources are limited. Donations are limited by 
donors’ willingness to give, and tax-exempt debt is subject to regulatory 
restrictions regarding use and amount.14  Not-for-profit hospitals may find 
other available financing schemes such as securitization, asset leveraging, 
and pooling schemes too risky to undertake. Conversions, therefore, may 
provide needed capital through equity financing and enhanced access to 
debt.15 Although not-for-profits may have access to the same sources of 
taxable debt as do for-profits, many may have unfavorable debt ratings 
that make the cost of commercial debt prohibitive. Second, equity may 
also be a cheaper source of capital than those sources easily available to 
14. There is a $150 million limitation on nonhospital debt (e.g., related businesses, clinics, 
buildings for professional services, efforts to integrate). This limit poses a problem for hospi- 
tals that operate under a master bond or debenture indenture, a written agreement under 
which bonds or debentures are issued, setting forth maturity dates, interest rates, and other 
terms. 
15. For-profit hospitals borrow more debt than  do not-for-profit hospitals (Frank and 
Salkever 1994). After accounting for tax deductions, taxable debt can be less expensive for 
a for-profit than tax-exempt debt is for a not-for-profit. 58  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
not-for-profit hospitals. Therefore, even hospitals that have adequate ac- 
cess to debt may prefer equity financing. The market spread between eq- 
uity and debt, caused in part by  bond insurance and state issuing agency 
fees, may make equity financing more desirable. High debt levels may also 
lead to agency problems, as managers of highly leveraged institutions en- 
gage in excessively risky activities whose costs they can transfer to bond- 
holders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Third, even if equity is not an inher- 
ently  more  desirable instrument  than  debt,  equity  is  perceived  as  an 
important currency by those involved in conversions and similar transac- 
tions. Hospital administrators hoping to become part of a larger system 
may find that access to equity generates more consolidation options. 
Projits 
Current and feared revenue declines have also motivated not-for-profit 
hospitals to convert. Actual  and  expected declines may  be  caused by 
market-specific changes such as overbedding, demographic changes, or 
increased competition attributable to reorganization by competitors. Con- 
versions may also provide a way for not-for-profit managers to avoid the 
risks of operating under new regulatory regimes or delivery systems that 
are expected to cause lower profits or that may increase the riskiness of 
hospital profits. Conversion activity increased, for example, with the im- 
plementation of  the Prospective Payment System in  1984, and again in 
the 1990s, as managed care began to make substantial inroads in health 
care delivery. 
Debt Service 
Not-for-profit hospitals generally fund their capital budgets with tax- 
exempt debt. For various reasons, such as revenue reductions due to mar- 
ket  changes, some hospitals find  they are not  able to service the debt. 
Selling to a cash-rich, for-profit buyer provides one way  of meeting debt 
obligations. 
2.3.2  Increased Efficiency 
Pate1 et al. (1994) suggest that for-profits may achieve greater dynamic 
efficiency in  resource allocation  than  not-for-profits because they  can 
more quickly enter and exit markets as conditions change. Others main- 
tain that for-profit hospitals are inherently more efficient than their not- 
for-profit counterparts because of superior management talent. Large for- 
profit  systems also have  access to efficiency-producing accounting and 
data processing systems. 
It is important to be  clear about the notion of  “efficiency.” For-profit 
hospitals are likely to be better at maximizing shareholder value than not- 
for-profit hospitals are at maximizing operating surpluses. This does not 
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even the interests of the original not-for-profit hospital, than are not-for- 
profit hospitals (Reinhardt 1996). 
Of course, if all that not-for-profit hospitals wanted from conversions 
was to obtain access to better management, they might just hire manage- 
ment services from a for-profit firm without actually changing their man- 
agement orientation. Indeed, Columbia/HCA’s  joint ventures generally in- 
cluded provisions under which it acts as day-to-day manager and is paid 
a management fee. The fact that the conversions were more than pur- 
chases of management fees suggests that there was more motivating the 
transaction than just potential efficiency gains. 
2.3.3  Defensive Strategies 
In the face of closure or a threatened takeover by  a long-term not-for- 
profit competitor, directors of failing not-for-profit hospitals may view for- 
profit partners as their best hope for securing a continuing presence in a 
community. Neighboring not-for-profit hospitals often have a history of 
quasi-competitive interactions that make mergers and joining operations 
ditFicult. 
For-profit buyers often promise to maintain operations at the acquired 
hospital, although many such promises are temporary or contingent on 
the good financial health of the hospital. In addition, conversion to for- 
profit status may release hospitals from cumbersome regulations, such as 
meeting mandatory  community benefit measures,  thus allowing them 
more flexibility to compete. 
2.3.4  Self-Interest 
Not-for-profit managers and directors may obtain job security and per- 
sonal financial gain from their involvement in conversions. Physicians of- 
ten favor conversions because the transactions include an opportunity for 
them to hold an ownership stake in the new entity-a  benefit that cannot 
be offered legally by a not-for-profit corporation. 
2.3.5  Culture 
The individual and collective perspectives, beliefs, and values of hos- 
pital directors also influence decisions to sell or partner. For example, 
people from a business background may have different beliefs about the 
importance of for-profit and not-for-profit ownership in the medical sec- 
tor.I6 Furthermore, culture may influence the choice of transaction part- 
ner. Local not-for-profit hospitals, for example, may have a long history 
of fierce competition that makes cooperation difficult. There are particular 
16. Typically, economists treat “culture”  as a residual explanation  for firm behavior. Here, 
we  have in mind a positive theory of why some managers would undertake actions different 
from other managers. 60  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
difficulties associated with merging institutions of various religious affili- 
ations. 
2.3.6  Mission Change 
A conversion may help a not-for-profit hospital change or fulfill its 
health care mission. Board members may decide that resources that could 
be better used to improve public health are inappropriately tied to acute 
care services. Converting a hospital allows board members to liquidate 
their investment in the hospital and apply both their human efforts and 
the financial resources they oversee to non-acute  care goals. 
Since conversion transactions typically produce large foundations, a 
common trade-off cited by many not-for-profit hospital executives is that 
between having the not-for-profit hospital in the community or having a 
for-profit hospital and substantial cash for other purposes. Understanding 
what this means is somewhat difficult. One interpretation is that the hos- 
pital executives want to move forward future profits into current years, 
which they cannot do on their own. A fair-market sale to a for-profit hos- 
pital company would make future profits available immediately. Alterna- 
tively, it may be that the managers of the not-for-profits believe they can 
persuade for-profit hospitals to overpay for their assets. This view seems 
difficult to believe, however, since most people are on only one hospital 
board and for-profit hospital executives acquire many hospitals each year 
and have substantial expertise in negotiating deals. Finally, it may be that 
for-profit companies are better at managing hospitals than not-for-profit 
directors, and some of the overall profits from better management can be 
transferred to the community. What is interesting about this view, however, 
is how little attention is generally paid to how the for-profit company will 
run the hospital. In many cases, for example, selling board members assert 
that the buyer promised to keep essential services (such as emergency 
rooms) open, but such promises are not in writing or, when they are, the 
promises are insufficiently specified. The transfer of resources to the not- 
for-profit foundation may thus come at the expense of some valuable hos- 
pital services. 
2.4  Case Studies-Why  Convert? 
Our case studies yielded two primary explanations regarding why hospi- 
tals convert; these findings are summarized in table 2.3. First, financial 
concerns are quite important in conversions, and these concerns are multi- 
faceted. Expectations about future profits and anticipated problems in ser- 
vicing debt played a key role in the conversions we  studied. Second, board 
culture or the perceived mission of the board, particularly as generated 
by  a board comprising mainly local business leaders, seems to influence 
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Table 2.3  Rationales for Hospital Conversions 
PresbyterianlS  t . Luke’s 
~  ~~ 
Sale to  Joint Venture with 
Explanation  Wesley-HCA  AM1  Reconversion  ColumbidHCA 
***  **  ***  Financial 
Efficiency  *  * 
Defensive strategy  *  * 
Self-interest  ? 
Culture 






Source: Authors’ opinions based on interviews, analysis, and newspaper reports. 
Note: Stars indicate the importance of the explanation,  as judged by  the authors. More important 
explanations have more stars. Question marks indicate uncertainty, again as judged by  the authors. 
Blanks indicate no evidence. 
2.4.1  Wesley Medical Center 
Three clusters of reasons motivated the Wesley sale to HCA. First, hos- 
pital directors and management decided the hospital’s mission had been 
adequately met and that the money invested in the hospital could be better 
used to improve the health of  Kansas’s residents. Several of  the former 
directors of Wesley Hospital indicated that they perceived that the choice 
was between having a hospital and having a hospital plus cash. 
Second, culture drove this transaction in at least two distinct ways. Our 
interviewees characterized the directors as businessmen whose decision to 
sell was simply a financial decision. Once talks with HCA opened, some 
directors were attracted by the excitement of dealing with a powerful, for- 
profit corporation and felt an affinity with HCA’s management. They had 
the opportunity to make a deal that would generate the highest price per 
bed paid at the time and would put them at the forefront of the conversion 
trend. Culture also affected the choice not to partner with other local not- 
for-profit hospitals. In Wichita, the most attractive potential not-for-profit 
partner was a Catholic hospital, a long-time competitor, with whom Wes- 
ley was unable to establish joint programs. 
Third, while  financial issues also motivated  the  sale,  they  played  a 
smaller role in the decision than did reasons of mission and culture. While 
interviewees declared that the conversion was not about a need for money, 
some stressed the importance of HCA’s promises to provide cash for cap- 
ital development (discussed below). In addition, concerns relating to the 
viability of operating Wesley under the prospective payment system influ- 
enced decision makers. The sale could be understood as a way to transfer 
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2.4.2  Columbia-Healthone 
history. 
Asset Sale to AMI 
Two types of concerns motivated PSL Corporation’s initial asset sale to 
AM1 in 1985. One concern was the financial viability of the hospitals. The 
hospital’s debt load, in particular, worried board members. Although the 
hospital only had approximately $45 million of outstanding debt, the man- 
agers and directors perceived constraints on their ability to access capital 
markets, and AM1 promised access to capital. Indeed, AM1 put nearly 
$100 million into the acquired hospital system within a five-year period. 
The board was also afraid that the advent of PPS and state interest in 
reviving certificate-of-need  requirements would lead to declines in the abil- 
ity of the hospitals to compete, and it believed AM1 could better handle 
the risk. Also, the board was uncertain about the future of  hospitals in 
Denver. 
In addition to financial concerns, culture played an important role in 
the initial sale. The board was heavily populated by  businesspeople who 
saw the sale to AM1 as an opportunity to place their hospital on the cut- 
ting edge of a coming health care trend. 
Asset Sale to PSL Healthcare Systems 
The reason for AMI’s sale was clear-financial  distress. AM1 was heav- 
ily in debt by  1991, and work on a new hospital building had stopped. The 
construction  and hospital management posed a heavy financial burden 
for AMI. 
The reasons behind the not-for-profit buyback are somewhat less clear. 
Upset by  AMI’s poor management and history of draining capital from 
Colorado, old board members reactivated their lingering commitment to 
the hospital. In fact, the incomplete patient tower exercised a spectral in- 
fluence over the  old board  members, many of  whom were physicians. 
Newspaper reports, however, suggested that hospital insiders realized sub- 
stantial gains from the transaction.”  PSL, in addition, purchased con- 
sulting, financial, and legal services from firms at which the board mem- 
bers worked.’*  The significant overlap between the old hospital board, the 
local AM1 advisory board, and the Colorado Trust board may have been 
the reason that concern for the hospital’s demise was translated into ac- 
tion. But the role of these factors is not completely clear. AMI’s advisory 
Different reasons motivated each transaction in Healthone’s corporate 
17. “The [PSL-AM11 deal was marred by charges of self-dealing by board members, who 
allegedly pocketed large transaction fees” (Meyer 1996). PSL Healthcare Corporation denied 
these reports. 
18. Specific examples were reported in the Denver Posr (Graham 1995). Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status  63 
board had no governing power and interested Colorado Trust board mem- 
bers recused themselves from the decision to support the buyout. 
Columbia-Healthone  Joint Venture 
This joint venture is perhaps the most typical of all of the transactions 
we investigated for this paper. It was motivated primarily by financial prob- 
lems, particularly debt overhang. PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s assumed a very 
high debt burden during the AM1 buyback (reportedly as high as $216 
million), and it assumed even more debt through subsequent mergers. 
Thus, Healthone faced a bleak future, servicing approximately $360 mil- 
lion of system debt. Virtually everyone we  spoke to stressed the impor- 
tance of the debt overhang as instrumental in the decision to form a joint 
venture. The poverty of Healthone might be somewhat overstated, how- 
ever. While Healthone was concerned about its bottom line, it signifi- 
cantly increased executive salaries (by 20-33  percent), which were already 
higher than national averages. Furthermore, it continued to pay board 
members until the summer of  1994, a controversial and rare practice in 
the not-for-profit w0r1d.I~ 
Fears about how an uncertain industry and policy future would affect 
profits were  also quelled by  the idea of a joint venture with a wealthy 
for-profit that had a demonstrated history of  generating high profits. In 
addition, merging with Columbia would bring access to managed care 
contracts that PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s wanted to guarantee. For example, 
Rose Hospital had contracts with two large managed care organizations 
that were seen as valuable sources of patients. Since Columbia-Healthone 
was so big, managed care companies in the Denver area would virtually 
have to contract with the combined institution, whereas Healthone on its 
own might be excluded from managed care contracts. 
As in the other transactions, culture and momentum influenced this 
joint venture. Discussions with other hospitals (Lutheran Medical Cen- 
ter and St. Joseph’s Hospital) proved unfruitful for both substantive and 
timing reasons. In early 1995, when Columbia/HCA bought one potential 
partner, Rose Hospital, timing pressed the board members. In addition, 
once the PresbyteriadSt.  Luke’s board began exploring transaction op- 
tions, it changed its focus from hospital operations to pursuing a reorgani- 
zation. The momentum of the deal may have influenced the board to com- 
plete the transaction. 
2.5  Case Studies-The  Effects of Conversions 
In this section, we  consider the effects of hospital conversions on the 
market for medical care. We divide our discussion into two parts: the effect 
19. The Colorado Trust pays its board members approximately $20,000 each. 64  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
of the conversion or joint venture (1) on the study hospital, and (2) on 
other hospitals and the community as a whole. 
The data that we use come primarily from Medicare cost reports, annual 
reports of hospitals that are filed with Medicare administrators. The cost 
report data are the only public data source with information on reven- 
ues, expenses, and assets of hospitals. We form profits as earnings less pa- 
tient care costs, excluding interest, taxes, depreciation, and assessments 
(EBITDA). This measure is standard in the literature; it avoids problems 
in the measurement of depreciation across institutions. The data may be 
subject to error. First, the amounts are self-reported and are only verified 
when Medicare conducts audits. Second, the reports filed during the first 
few years after a conversion may not accurately reflect financial status 
because converting entities are entitled to special deductions that obscure 
conventional profit measures. Finally, recent news reports suggest that Co- 
1umbidHCA routinely overestimated its costs to Medicare. If these re- 
ports are true, our conclusions  regarding profits at the case-study hospitals 
are conservative since they reflect the enhanced cost estimates. 
We  focus our analysis on the financial health of the hospitals and the 
flow of patients to different hospitals. We would also like to examine mea- 
sures of the quality of medical care, but the data to do this are not avail- 
able. 
Our results, summarized in table 2.4, address changes in the converting 
institution and other institutions in the market. For-profit buyers (and 
joint ventures) seem adept at increasing profit margins in converted hos- 
pitals-partly  because they effectively manage billing to take advantage 
of  reimbursement loopholes, and partly because they reduce staff as a 
method of reducing costs. Not-for-profit competitors of the converted (or 
joint-ventured) hospital react by  consolidating and copying the billing 
practices of the new for-profit. 
2.5.1  Wesley Medical Center 
Direct Effects on the Converting Institution 
We begin with the direct effects of the merger on Wesley Medical Cen- 
ter. One of the goals of the conversion was to raise money for capital im- 
provements. Figure 2.4 shows the increase in fixed assets-plant  and equip- 
ment-at  Wesley. Fixed assets at not-for-profit Wesley hospital were about 
$80 million in 1985. In 1986, after HCA bought the hospital, fixed assets 
rose by  about $50 million and remained at that higher level for the next 
decade. These additional assets were largely new centers for reproductive 
health and cardiac and pulmonary rehabilitation. 
Perhaps more important, however, is the profitability of the resulting 
institution. Figure 2.5 shows the profit rate at Wesley Medical Center from Table 2.4  Effects of Hospital Conversions 
Wesley  PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s 
HCA  ColumbiaMCA  AM1  Reconversion  Columbia/HCA 
Profits  0 
costs  0 
Billing management  0 
Managed care 
contracts  0 
Staffing  0 
Infrastructure  tt 
Physicians  0 
Patient shares  0 
Consolidation  0 
Own Institution 
tt  1 
11  t 
ttt  0 
0  0 
1J1  0 
tt  tt 
-1.11  0 
Other Institutions 
0  0 
tt  0 
t  tt 
1  11 
0  ttt 
0  ttt 
0  11 
0  tt 
0  0 
0  0 
0  tt 
Source: Authors’ opinions based on interviews, analysis, and newspaper reports. 
Note: Up and down arrows indicate positive and negative findings, respectively. More arrows indicate 
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1985 through 1995.”  Wesley’s profits were about 5 percent in  1985. Be- 
tween 1986 and 1990, under HCA’s management, profit rates were nega- 
tive. Although it appears that HCA was losing money on the hospital, 
two factors may explain the apparent losses. First, the increase in infra- 
structure noted above required substantial up-front costs, which reduced 
short-term profits. In addition, HCA charged the hospital with $12.4 mil- 
lion in interest expense and deferred loan cost transfers from the parent’s 
$3.6 billion leveraged buyout by TF Investments, a corporation organized 
by HCA management. By  the early 1990s’ after these costs had been in- 
curred, Wesley’s profits were about 2-5  percent. 
In  1993, Columbia/HCA began  managing the hospital, and  profits 
soared. In 1993, 1994, and 1995, ColumbidHCA’s profit rates were about 
10-1 5 percent annually. 
To  give some comparative analysis of profit rates in Wichita, we  also 
show profit rates for Wesley’s  largest competitors-two  Catholic hospi- 
tals, St. Francis Medical Center (587 beds) and St. Joseph’s Medical Cen- 
ter (388 beds). In 1995, these two hospitals merged to create the Via Christi 
Medical Center. We  form a simulated Via  Christi system by  combining 
the two institutions throughout the time period, which we  then compare 
20. The hospital reported only six months of information in  1985. This might affect profit 
rates if profits are different in the first and second halves of the year. This is unlikely to be 
very important, however. Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status  67 
to Wesley’s operations. As figure 2.5 shows, profit rates for Via Christi con- 
tinually averaged about 1-2  percent through 1993. 
How  could profits increase so dramatically under ColumbidHCA? Two 
factors are at work. First, Medicare revenues increased. Figure 2.6 shows 
real Medicare reimbursement per admission between 1985 and 1995. Be- 
ginning in 1992, Medicare reimbursement rose dramatically and remained 
high. While we  do not have definitive data on why  this occurred, we  sus- 
pect Columbia-Wesley increased reimbursements by effectively exploiting 
common Medicare loopholes. To understand these loopholes, consider an 
example of an elderly patient with a hip fracture. She needs some acute 
services (e.g., setting the fracture or a hip replacement) and some rehabili- 
tation services (e.g., help learning to walk). Since 1984, Medicare has paid 
for inpatient admissions on a per-admission basis, paying a single amount 
for each admission regardless of the services provided. Medicare, however, 
pays separately for rehabilitation services that are provided independently 
of a hospital admission. It is not difficult to see the revenue-maximizing 
strategy. Where traditionally a hospital would provide acute and rehabili- 
tation services in the same admission, the hospital exploiting the loophole 
will  provide the acute services only during the hospital admission and 
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the hospital collects two payments. Indeed, in 1992 HCA opened its own 
rehabilitation hospital in Wichita (HCmesley Rehabilitation Center), 
which could facilitate multiple reimbursements to the hospital for each 
Medicare recipient treated. We  include the rehabilitation center’s profits 
in our calculation of Columbia/Wesley’s  profits. 
Similarly, Columbia opened a skilled nursing facility (SNF) at Wesley in 
1995. These facilities provide another mechanism with which to unbundle 
hospital admissions (Newhouse and Byre  1988). Medicare admissions to 
Wesley-the  hospital and nursing home combined-soared  in  1995. It 
looks in figure 2.6 as if the opening of the SNF lowered Medicare reim- 
bursement per patient. But if we  assume that all of the Medicare admis- 
sions to the nursing facility were also admissions to the hospital (so that 
the appropriate denominator is the number of hospital admissions), we 
find no significant reduction in Medicare reimbursement in 1995. 
There are other accounting changes ColumbidHCA might have made. 
For example, Medicare reimbursement is typically greater if  the patient 
has “complications and/or comorbidities” than if  the patient  does not 
have complications or comorbidities. Hospitals will thus search for com- 
plications to maximize Medicare reimbursement, a process termed “DRG 
creep” (Carter, Newhouse, and Relles 1990). Without microdata, however, 
we do not know how much Columbia Wesley’s number of complicated pa- 
tients increased. 
In addition to an increase in Medicare revenues, ColumbidHCA re- 
duced costs. Figure 2.7 shows the growth in revenues and costs per admis- 
sion between  1985 and  1995. Real costs actually fell in  1993 and  1994, 
before rising in 1995.2’ Figure 2.8  shows the source of some of this cost 
reduction. Length of stay in the hospital fell dramatically over this period. 
Among Medicare patients, for example, average hospital stays fell from 
8.1 days in 1992 to 6.6 days in 1995, a 19 percent reduction. Somewhat 
surprisingly, nursing input did not fall. Licensed practical nurses (LPNs) 
per patient fell over this period, but registered nurses (RNs) per patient 
declined only slightly. 
In our discussions at Wesley hospital, however, the reduction in nurses 
and nurses aides was described as a major source of tension between phy- 
sicians and Columbia. The source of this tension appears to have risen 
21. A word for researchers about sources of cost data. We  have compared AHA data on 
costs for Wesley with Medicare cost report data. The AHA data are flawed in several impor- 
tant respects. HCA did not report all its costs when it was running the hospital, with the 
exception of one year. Thus, costs in AHA reports appeared to plummet when HCA bought 
the hospital and soared when Columbia began operating. Neither conclusion is true. But the 
cost report data are not entirely accurate either. In the cost report data, HCA appeared to 
count routine births (without complications) as discharges when hospitals generally do not 
do so. As a result, in the cost report data admissions soar under HCA and fall under Colum- 
bia. This is also not true. We  use the admissions data from the AHA and cost data from the 
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after 1995. In January 1996, Wesley eliminated 204 positions (136 layoffs, 
5 1 early retirements, and 17 voluntary departures). In January 1997, Wes- 
ley announced plans to eliminate 383 more jobs by the end of September 
1997. 
Indeed, the tension between the hospital and its physicians was suffi- 
ciently great that many physicians at Wesley  sought alternative practice 
arrangements. Many moved some of their practice to Via Christi, a rela- 
tively simple move since Wichita doctors may easily garner admitting priv- 
ileges at all of the Wichita hospitals. Some doctors took more drastic mea- 
sures. In 1995, a group of orthopedic surgeons opened their own hospital, 
the  1 1-bed Kansas Surgery and Recovery Center. The Center treats rou- 
tine, high-reimbursement  orthopedic cases (particularly insured patients). 
The cardiovascular surgeons are building their own hospital as well. 
Columbia wanted to entice the physicians to admit only at Wesley by 
offering them financial interests in the hospital, as it does in many places, 
but this strategy fared poorly. In fact, the failed negotiations between Co- 
lumbia and the physicians of the Wichita Clinic-the  largest primary care 
service in the area-have  led to a lawsuit by the physicians charging anti- 
trust violations on the part  of  Columbia.22  When the negotiations fell 
through, Columbia hired about 20 percent of the physicians (1  3 people, 
including 40 percent of  the family practice department). The remaining 
physicians claim that Columbia hired the physicians at excessive salaries 
and bonuses, and with promises to indemnify the doctors for damages 
resulting from breaches of noncompete clauses with the clinic as a preda- 
tory attempt to harm the clinic’s business. The clinic also charged Colum- 
bia with misappropriating trade secrets such as internal operations infor- 
mation, fiscal performance data, and salary information. Finally, the clinic 
argued that Columbia tortiously interfered with the physician contracts 
and the clinic’s business expectancy. 
To discern how the change to for-profit form affected Wesley’s ability 
to negotiate favorable contracts, we  analyzed the hospital’s contractual 
allowances and discounts. If  Wesley’s  new corporate form helped it to 
exercise market power, this fact might be reflected in these data. This does 
not appear to be the case, however. Wesley’s contractual allowances and 
discounts rose from 12 percent of charges in 1985 to 43 percent of charges 
in 1995, while Via Christi’s rose from 9 percent of charges to 44 percent 
of charges in this same period. Contractual allowances and discounts are 
based on list prices instead of costs and, therefore, may mask some reduc- 
tion in discounts. The similarity between the for-profit and the not-for- 
profit’s trends is still noteworthy. 
22. See Wichita Clinic, PA.  v.  ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp., 1997 WL 225966 (D. Kan. 
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Efects on Competitors and the  Wichita Market 
The Wesley  conversion not only affected Wesley  hospital, it also af- 
fected the community as a whole. The Wesley conversion seems to have 
sparked increased consolidation in the hospital market more generally. 
As noted earlier, St. Francis and St. Joseph’s merged in 1995 to form Via 
Christi Medical Center. Several people speculated that fear of  Wesley’s 
success as a for-profit drove the merger between these two institutions. 
The Catholic hospitals, however, explained that they merged because it 
was wrong for two Catholic hospitals to compete. 
As figure 2.5 shows, the combined institutions have done very well  fi- 
nancially. Where the two hospitals forming Via  Christi’s had combined 
profits of about 1-2  percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the profit 
rate rose to 7 percent in 1995. The reasons for this increase in profits ap- 
pear to be similar to those for Columbia/Wesley. St. Francis, for example, 
opened a rehabilitation unit in 1994; Via Christi acquired a rehabilitation 
center in 1995; and in 1996, Via Christi planned to open a 36-bed continu- 
ing care subsidiary within the hospital, specifically to benefit from long- 
term acute care reimbursement. The increase in the number of rehabilita- 
tion beds in the Wichita area is astounding. In 1985, Wesley hospital had 
18 rehabilitation beds and St. Joseph’s had 31 rehabilitation beds. In 1991, 
HCANesley had 26 rehabilitation beds and St. Joseph’s had 37 beds. By 
1995, Columbia-Wesley Rehabilitation Hospital  had  50  rehabilitation 
beds; Via  Christi Rehabilitation Center had 40  rehabilitation beds; St. 
Francis Hospital had 32 rehabilitation beds; and St. Joseph’s Hospital had 
38  rehabilitation beds. The number of rehabilitation beds more than tri- 
pled between 1985 and 1995. 
Similarly, Via  Christi also cut costs. As figure 2.9 shows, the average 
length of stay for all patients, and particularly Medicare patients, fell sub- 
stantially after  1993. Between  1993 and 1995, for example, the average 
length of stay for Medicare patients at Via Christi declined by one day. 
The experience of our case market offers a new understanding of how 
the presence of  for-profit hospitals affect hospital markets-one  that 
raises an “inverse-Hansmann problem.” Hansmann (1980, 835)  argued 
that the presence of not-for-profit hospitals in markets forces for-profit 
hospitals to keep quality high. Here, having for-profit hospitals in the mar- 
ket appears to cause not-for-profit hospitals to adopt the same money- 
making measures employed by for-profits. In this case, most of the mea- 
sures come at the expense of the government. 
Perhaps more important than the amount of  rehabilitation care that 
patients receive is whether acute care patients have access to the most 
appropriate care. There has been particular concern that for-profit hospi- 
tals will shirk on care for the poor, leaving such patients to their not-for- 72  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
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profit competitors. Our data do not indicate how much charity care dif- 
ferent hospitals provide.23  It does break out admissions for Medicare and 
Medicaid patients, however. Figure 2.10  shows the share of  all patients, 
Medicare patients, and Medicaid patients in Wichita admitted to Wesley 
hospital. 
These data do not suggest much cause for alarm. While Wesley's share 
of the overall Wichita market has been falling, its share of Medicaid pa- 
tients has been constant or rising. Of course, different trends may be oc- 
curring for the uninsured relative to Medicaid patients, but our first pass 
evidence finds no adverse effect for the Medicaid group. 
But some fragmentation of the medical care market is occurring. Wich- 
ita has seen an increase in surgi-centers and stand-alone clinics. The new 
orthopedic clinic, for example, saw no Medicaid patients in its first year 
of operation (108 patients in total), and one suspects the new cardiology 
center will  also cater to the wealthy and well  insured. In addition, the 
hospitals have attempted to attract low-risk patients to their facilities. In 
23. As noted above, hospitals report contractual allowances and discounts on their Medi- 
care cost reports, which include uncompensated  care, but  they also include discounts to 
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1996, Wesley opened a free-standing  birthing center that only admits low- 
risk patients. Soon thereafter, an independent obstetrics practice group 
approached Via  Christi about opening a similar center on the Catholic 
campus. If these new ventures survive, there will be some segregation of 
the health system by class, propagated as much by  doctors severing their 
hospital affiliations as by hospitals establishing independent clinics. 
2.5.2  PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s- AM1 
Direct Efects on Converting Institution 
Once again, we start with the effect of the conversion on the converting 
institution. One of the rationales for the asset sale to AM1 was to get more 
capital for PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s. Figure 2.1 1 shows the fixed assets of 
PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s from 1985 through 1994. From the pre-AM1 pe- 
riod through 1990, assets nearly doubled. 
To  examine PresbyteriadSt.  Luke’s financial performance before and 
after the sale to AMI, figure 2.12 shows the profit rate for Presbyterian/ 
St. Luke’s hospital from 1985 to 1994. We  omit data for 1995 because 
there is no way to separate out profits for these hospitals from the other 74  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
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parts of Col~mbia-HealthOne.~~  When PresbyteriadSt.  Luke’s was  sold 
to AM1 in 1985, it had average profits of about 8 percent. During the AM1 
years, 1986 through 1990, profits steadily declined. In 1989 and 1990, the 
24. We  aggregate the two institutions to form profits prior to 1990, even though profits 
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hospital lost money. In the five months of 1991 that AM1 owned the hospi- 
tal, the hospital reported extremely large profits, but we  suspect that this 
is an accounting anomaly rather than a true increase in profits. After AM1 
reconverted to not-for-profit form, reported profit rates increased dramati- 
cally. These data, based on Medicare cost reports, seem questionable,  how- 
ever, because the AHA data show much larger costs, We  were unable to 
explain the variance. 
As we  observed in the Wesley case study, contractual allowances and 
discounts rose under AMI’s for-profit ownership of Presbyterian and St. 
Luke’s. Between  1987 and 1992, contractual discounts climbed from 27 
percent to 46 percent of total patient charges. PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s clos- 
est competitor in the Denver market is St. Joseph’s hospital (405 beds). 
Over the same time period, contractual discounts at St. Joseph’s rose from 
12 to 33 percent. Discounts at PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s rose somewhat less 
rapidly than at St. Joseph’s, but we do not know if St. Joseph’s rose more 
rapidly simply because it began at a lower base. 
Under the control of not-for-profit PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s, contractual 
allowances and discounts fell. Between 1992 and 1994, contractual allow- 
ances and discounts fell from 46 to 37 percent. At St. Joseph’s, in contrast, 
contractual  allowances and  discounts rose  from  33  to 41  percent  of 
charges between 1992 and 1994. 
Given the lack of any discernible increase in profits under AMI, we do 
not report a detailed analysis of changes in revenues or expenses. 
ESfects on Competitors and Market 
Denver is a bigger market than Wichita, so the effects of the conversion 
on the market as a whole were necessarily smaller. As figure 2.12 shows, 
profit margins at St. Joseph’s fell in the late 1980s but then rebounded in 
the early 1990s. 
We  also examined the share of Medicare and Medicaid patients going 
to PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s. Figure 2.13 shows changes in PresbyterianISt. 
Luke’s share of the patient market before and after the sale. Presbyterian/ 
St. Luke’s  share of the hospital market was falling over this time period, 
but it fell disproportionately more for the non-Medicaid population com- 
pared to the Medicaid population. After  1991, PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s 
share of the market rose among both Medicaid and non-Medicaid pa- 
tients. The evidence in figure 2.13 does not suggest that care to the poor 
was cut particularly heavily under for-profit management. 
On the whole, the evidence thus suggests relatively small effects of the 
sale to AM1 on operations of PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s hospital or the Den- 
ver market as a whole. Indeed, profits, if anything, fell under AMI’s man- 
agement. This is consistent with the financial difficulties that AM1 found 
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2.5.3  ColumbidHealthOne 
Because the Columbia-Healthone joint venture occurred so recently, 
we were unable to obtain reliable data regarding the effects of that transac- 
tion. But some preliminary information about the effects of the joint ven- 
ture is available. In 1996 Columbia-Healthone reported profits similar to 
those of its not-for-profit competitors. Hospital profits in the Denver area 
increased an average of 7.2 percent in  1996, and Columbia-Healthone’s 
profits increased by 7.2 percent as well. For the Columbia-Healthone sys- 
tem as a whole, reported profits were 3 percent in 1996. 
We  suspect that Columbia-Healthone, like Wesley,  has attempted to 
raise profits by aggressively managing government billings. According to 
the Colorado Hospital Association, Medicare inpatient charges per pa- 
tient rose by  16 percent in PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s in 1996, while they had 
fallen by nearly one-quarter (in nominal terms) in the previous three years. 
Unfortunately, we  do not know about Medicare revenues, so we  cannot 
determine whether the increased charges resulted from higher list prices 
or increased billable services. Columbia-Healthone also appears to have Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status  77 
cut costs substantially. Between 1994 and 1996, inpatient costs per admis- 
sion fell by  3 percent in nominal terms and Medicare average length of 
stay fell by 1.3 days. The number of full-time equivalent employees per oc- 
cupied bed fell by  15 percent. 
There is  some indication that some of these changes were  illegal. In 
October 1997, federal investigators asked two Columbia-Healthone hos- 
pitals to turn over some patient records as part of  an investigation of 
Columbia’s billing practices. Columbia-Healthone has begun to change 
its  management  practices.  According  to  one  report,  125  Columbia- 
Healthone managers who were  eligible for bonuses based on  1996 job 
performance will not be eligible for such bonuses in the future. 
The controversy surrounding ColumbidHCA has led some members of 
the public and some members of the Healthone board to question aspects 
of the joint venture. In the fall of  1997, the Healthone representatives 
launched efforts to renegotiate the $370 million loan assumed by the LLC. 
Although the Healthone board  representatives perceived the approxi- 
mately 17.5 percent interest rate to be the best they could negotiate at the 
time of the joint venture, there has been some speculation that the deal 
might not be renegotiated. The Healthone faction has also exercised its 
power to block Columbia-inspired initiatives. For example, newspaper re- 
ports indicate that when the Columbia management told the board that it 
planned to lay off  employees, the Healthone faction voted against the 
proposal and forced Columbia to recalculate the budget.25 
One of  the striking features of this joint venture is how  much of  the 
Denver hospital market it encompasses. In  1996, Columbia-Healthone 
accounted for 37 percent of all admissions to Denver hospitals. The Fed- 
eral Trade Commission reviewed the joint venture but never filed objec- 
tions to it. Allowing such a large percentage of a market’s hospitals to be 
controlled by one entity raises ordinary monopoly-related concerns as well 
as the risk that the entity’s policies may have negative and particularly 
widespread effects. 
2.6  Conclusions 
Our case studies suggest two primary explanations why  hospitals con- 
vert from not-for-profit to for-profit form-(1)  financial concerns and 
(2) board culture and perceived mission. Although we  expected to find 
that financial concerns were important, we learned that such concerns are 
multifaceted. Expectations about future profits and anticipated problems 
servicing debt were central to selling directors, as were pessimistic views 
of government reimbursement policies. 
Our results suggest a mixed view of the effects of hospital conversions. 
25. The reduction in  employment noted above resulted from attrition. 78  David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz 
On the one hand, we find some efficiencies associated with conversion to 
for-profit form. For-profit hospitals cut costs when not-for-profit hospitals 
cannot do so.26  For-profits also provide capital or relieve debt burdens, 
which not-for-profit hospitals could not otherwise do. And we  find no 
evidence that for-profit hospitals reduce quality or cut back on access to 
the poor, although our measures of these effects are admittedly crude. 
But the implications of for-profit organization are not entirely benefi- 
cial. For-profit hospitals make money in part by increasing reimbursement 
from the public sector. This is a gain for the hospital but a loss for society 
as a whole.*’  And having more for-profit hospitals leads to some fragmen- 
tation of the market between rich and poor, although this occurs as much 
from physician actions as from hospital actions. 
Perhaps the most important issue raised by  our results is the symbio- 
sis between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Our results show that 
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals both influence and are influenced 
by  each other’s actions. Years ago, these actions were seen as beneficial; 
if  not-for-profit hospitals maintained high-quality care, for-profit hospi- 
tals might have to do the same. But our results highlight the other side of 
this coin. When for-profit hospitals exploit Medicare loopholes, not-for- 
profit hospitals learn to do the same, or believe they must copy for-profits 
to compete. If for-profit hospitals skimp on the quality of care, not-for- 
profit hospitals might follow suit. The influence of  for-profits will  only 
grow as they become a larger part of hospital markets, such as Columbia- 
Healthone in Denver. The possibility that for-profit hospitals will encour- 
age not-for-profit hospitals to reduce their public goods provision is a sub- 
stantial concern as the health care marketplace changes. 
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Comment on Chapters 1 and 2  M. Kathleen Kenyon 
Introduction 
I have been asked to comment on two papers on hospital conversions, 
the first by  Sloan, Taylor, and Conover and the second by  Cutler and 
Horwitz. From my  perspective,‘ both of these excellent papers touch on 
the truth and point to a bigger picture that needs to be addressed much 
more explicitly. Cutler and Horwitz’s in-depth case studies of two conver- 
sions of large hospitals, now owned by Columbia, have an almost scene- 
of-the-crime interest, given Columbia’s recent troubles with the Depart- 
ment of  Justice. Their conclusions suggest that for-profits are bad role 
M. Kathleen Kenyon, J.D., is general counsel of Deaconess Billings Clinic, a tax-exempt 
integrated health care organization in Billings, Montana. 
1. Commenting on two papers on hospital conversions, by economists of this stature, has 
me somewhat out of my  natural habitat. My perspective comes from having investigated 
and defended hospital mergers (as an antitrust lawyer), watched the industry from a policy 
perspective (as a Capitol Hill staffer and legislative counsel for a trade association), and 
served as general counsel to an integrated, not-for-profit health system that owns a hospital 
and physician group practice. 80  Comment on Chapters 1 and 2 
models, leading not-for-profits that share their markets to follow them in 
reimbursement maximization, with the federal Medicare coffers as the 
prime victim. On the other hand, Sloan, Taylor, and Conover, in a disci- 
plined, methodologically complex investigation of a variety of relatively 
small conversions, come to conclusions that appear to go in the opposition 
direction. Their conclusions could be seen as a defense of for-profit con- 
versions: For-profits pay (perhaps overpay) a fair price for the hospitals 
they acquire, invest in much-needed facility improvements, and continue 
to provide comparable levels of charity care and other services. In contrast 
to the possible benefits of conversion to for-profit ownership, Sloan, Tay- 
lor, and Conover find that, in two instances, conversions of small not-for- 
profits into larger not-for-profit systems are something of a steal by  the 
larger not-for-profits. 
Both studies advance the intelligent discussion of an important policy 
question that is also politically charged (and, for that reason, resists intelli- 
gent discussion). What are the social implications of the growth of the for- 
profit sector in health care, and, especially, the implications of the conver- 
sions of hospitals from not-for-profit to for-profit status? 
Three Overarching Issues 
Need for Political Economic Context 
I have three overarching gripes about these papers. Both papers cry 
out for placing the conversions they investigate into the larger political 
economic context of the health care industry. Hospitals are only one seg- 
ment of the health care industry (and an increasingly less powerful one). 
It isn’t just hospitals that have been converting to for-profit status and 
becoming part of large, publicly traded systems; insurerdHMOs and phy- 
sicians have as well.  At one time, all Blue Cross Blue Shield plans were 
not-for-profit; today many are not, and more are looking toward for-profit 
conversion. Many of the not-for-profit HMOs formed in the 1970s in the 
wake of the HMO Act have converted to for-profit status and been merged 
into large, publicly traded corporations. For-profit insurers have expanded 
dramatically into managed care products. 
Similarly, physicians are consolidating dramatically into ever  larger 
groups. These groups are not, by and large, Mayo Clinic-like  foundations 
(which are not-for-profit, tax-exempt, and dedicated to teaching and re- 
search as well as provision of health care); rather, they are managed by 
multi-billion-dollar physician practice management companies traded on 
Wall Street. 
Furthermore, your local physicians and hospitals have less control over 
decisions about how and where health care dollars are spent than they did 
in the past. Health care is becoming like the rest of  the economy, with Comment on  Chapters 1 and 2  81 
the purchasers (especially the better informed, larger purchasers-large 
employers, unions, and government) demanding value and accountability 
from both the insurance companies (especially managed care companies) 
and the providers they turn to with their health care dollars. The payers, 
rather than hospitals and physicians, increasingly hold economic power. 
That is the context (dramatically abbreviated and simplified) in which 
to view  hospital conversions and  to question their social significance. 
Placed in that context, it becomes clear that you cannot understand hos- 
pital conversions by  looking only at hospitals pre- and postmerger. And 
you cannot understand the social implications of  for-profit conversions 
without looking at the whole industry. 
Need for a More Critical View of Medicare 
My second gripe, really a subcategory of the first, is directed primarily 
toward the paper -by Cutler and Horwitz. Their paper is not sufficiently 
critical of the role of Medicare in health care markets. Medicare is wonder- 
ful for at least one reason: It guarantees health care (except outpatient phar- 
maceuticals, certain preventive services, and a few other important health 
care benefits) to older Americans. Beyond that, Medicare’s  method of pay- 
ing for health care services and the legal barriers to provider integration 
posed by  some Medicare laws and regulations have created or worsened 
much of the inefficiency in health care, especially for providers trying to 
provide the full continuum of health care services in order to be able to 
deliver quality care while controlling costs. 
It is a mistake to condemn behavior that appears calculated to increase 
Medicare reimbursements without a very careful look at whether the be- 
havior being condemned makes sense viewed  from other perspectives, 
such as the perspective of physicians committed to quality care or of com- 
mercial payers (the second largest source of hospital revenues, after Medi- 
care). Cutler and Honvitz, for instance, criticize Columbia, and the not- 
for-profits that arguably follow in Columbia’s tracks, for building rehabili- 
tation units and adding transitional care beds, skilled nursing facilities, 
and home health in order to maximize Medicare reimbursement. The crit- 
icism should only be justified if, in a quality-driven, efficient health care 
system, you would not have, in the numbers you have today, these less- 
intense alternatives to medical surgical inpatient beds. Based upon conver- 
sations with physicians and representatives of well-regarded health plans, 
I suspect that if you removed Medicare from the picture entirely, and sim- 
ply had enlightened geriatricians and caring payers designing high-quality, 
cost-effective health care for older Americans, you would find a heavy re- 
liance on these less-intense,  specialized health care alternatives  to acute care 
hospitals. Furthermore, one wonders whether patients would prefer to re- 
cuperate in an acute care hospital bed when other less medically intense 
environments are available. 82  Comment on Chapters 1 and 2 
That stated, it may well be that Columbia built all of those rehab beds, 
as Cutler and Honvitz suggest, primarily to take advantage of Medicare 
reimbursement “loopholes.” That subjective intent should not be imputed 
as the primary motive to others, including other hospitals in Denver and 
Wichita. If the move toward providing the full continuum of care is good 
for patients and makes sense as a possible cost saver to more enlightened 
payers than Medicare, maybe the other hospitals that have added such 
units are doing so not because of the corrosive influence of the for-profits, 
Obviously, however, the fact that Medicare has created economic incen- 
tives to reduce hospital length of stay, while making another payment for 
rehab and other step-down units, has undoubtedly made it economically 
more feasible to build such units. That such building has occurred should 
not surprise economists or Medicare. 
Ask the Question Differently and Suggest 
a Better Explanatory Framework 
My third gripe, which follows from the first, is that these papers should 
have viewed conversions as simply one response to current pressures fac- 
ing all providers and payers in health care. The bigger question is, How 
do not-for-profits differ from for-profits, if at all, in their response to eco- 
nomically driven changes in health care? While both papers provide valu- 
able evidence for an explanation, neither takes the step of explicitly sug- 
gesting an explanatory framework for future researchers to pursue to 
answer that question. 
Whatever that explanatory framework might be, these papers suggest 
that it would look at legal, cultural, and contextual factors. 
Legally, not-for-profit, tax-exempt hospitals differ from for-profits be- 
cause they must be  organized (“the organizational test”) and operated 
(“the operational test”) to benefit the community (“the community benefit 
standard”), and they are prohibited from operating to benefit insiders (pri- 
vate inurement) or other individuals, except incidentally (private benefit). 
If they abandon any of these basics, they cannot be tax-exempt not-for- 
profits. These legal requirements have real effects for the daily operations 
of not-for-profit hospitals and limit their ability to respond to external de- 
mands for change in ways that for-profits can. 
It is clear from these papers, however, that while all tax-exempt hos- 
pitals operate under similar legal constraints, they do not all respond to 
them in the same way in difficult economic times. Apparently, culture and 
context matters. Researchers need to come up with a typology of not-for- 
profit hospitals that captures the cultural variables that matter. They need 
to identify contextual factors that might explain why  culturally similar 
not-for-profits make different decisions in response to similar economic 
pressure-factors  like the HHI analysis in Sloan, Taylor, and Conover; 
excess beds in the market; the relative financial size and strength of provid- Comment on Chapters 1 and 2  83 
ers in the market; the presence of effective employer purchasing coalitions; 
and how concentrated and entrenched the managed care health plans are 
in the market. 
My  guess (supported by  some evidence from these papers) would be 
that not-for-profit hospitals that convert are different from those not-for- 
profits that do not convert, since hospitals everywhere are, in one way or 
another, facing increased financial pressures, and most do not convert. I 
also believe that most, but certainly not all, not-for-profit hospitals are 
different from for-profit hospitals in measurable ways and that the dra- 
matic expansion of the for-profit sector in health care will have significant 
social implications that research will eventually identify. 
Evidence on the Implications of Conversions 
Do we find in these papers evidence that not-for-profit ownership (espe- 
cially private, not-for-profit ownership), rather than for-profit ownership, 
makes any difference in responding to increasingly intense financial pres- 
sures? 
If the only thing you worry about is the dollar value dedicated to charity 
care (which tax-exempt hospitals are not legally required to provide), the 
answer is no (and the researchers giving that answer could form a chorus 
at this point). The research by  Sloan, Taylor, and Conover also suggests 
that the type of services do not, in the exceedingly short time frame they 
observed, vary significantly between not-for-profits  and for-profits, nor do 
they change significantly postconversion, at least in any direction that 
would suggest that not-for-profits are more willing to support needed but 
unprofitable services. I look forward to more long-term data on these mat- 
ters, but I also believe a more nuanced look is needed, (Sloan, Taylor, and 
Conover, by dividing services into three categories, including services that 
are likely to be unprofitable but are important in the community, take a 
good step toward a more nuanced look.) For instance, timing of entry and 
exit for important services, where the profitability is unclear, may differ 
between not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals, at least if you control on 
the financial depth of the institutions. The dollar value of charity care may 
not vary based on ownership, but how  those dollars are targeted may. 
Efforts to facilitate and establish connections with outside service provid- 
ers when the local hospital cannot afford to provide an essential service 
itself may differ. 
In general, I would expect many of the benefits of the not-for-profit 
organizational form to be hidden in staff time devoted to particular com- 
munity needs or to involvement in community efforts to address social 
problems with health consequences. These differences are difficult, but not 
impossible, to measure. In the long run, communities may find that those 
differences matter. A board composed of members genuinely motivated 84  Comment on Chapters 1 and 2 
by a mission and committed by  law to the community benefit legal stan- 
dard are simply more likely to look at the long-term interests of their 
community and to get engaged. 
The most interesting evidence from these papers addresses why not-for- 
profit hospitals that turn to conversion as a solution to their problems do 
so. (In the next round of research, evidence from those not-for-profits  that 
faced economic challenges and did not convert would be  useful.) The 
answer both papers suggest is “cultural.” Cutler and Horwitz tell us that 
boards dominated by businesspeople may be more willing to convert to 
for-profit status and less committed to a not-for-profit, tax-exempt struc- 
ture. This may be especially so if they can come out of the deal with what 
they regard as a mission intact at the hospital, in the form of a continuing 
commitment to charity care by the resulting for-profit hospital, and with 
money for a foundation that continues to serve the community. If the evi- 
dence were stronger that the resulting foundations did a great deal more 
for the health of  the community than pay for unprofitable services and 
teaching in the now for-profit hospital that the foundation board members 
used to direct, this mission-plus-money argument might be more convinc- 
ing. More research is needed on the role of foundations in continuing and 
expanding their health care missions beyond the bricks and mortar of 
hospital services. 
Both papers suggest that conversions take place in part because the not- 
for-profit board worries about an uncertain future or is facing community, 
tax, cultural, regulatory, or political pressures that make it difficult for 
those hospitals to respond to external financial pressures. Anyone who 
has been through the pain of changing a long-standing community hospi- 
tal (which is probably also one of the largest employers in town), on mat- 
ters as simple as who runs the food service or as difficult as reducing nurs- 
ing staff as patient length of  stay drops, can understand the attraction of 
putting such matters in the hands of experienced for-profit hospital man- 
agers they believe will  be less constrained by  local pressures. Local not- 
for-profit boards unable to act and ineffective hospital management, after 
all, are not likely to have much benefit for the community. On the other 
hand, does the community lose something when the local hospital (or 
health plan or physician group) is run day-to-day by corporate managers 
whose fiduciary obligations run through Wall Street to shareholders who 
cannot possibly understand the role of that hospital in the community, 
except as it affects profitability? 
We do find some rather intriguing evidence in these papers that conver- 
sions worry people. Sloan, Taylor, and Conover, despite finding no sig- 
nificant negative effects of conversions with regard to the general fairness 
of the deal or loss of services, report communities worrying about a loss 
of community control when their hospitals converted to either for-profit 
or larger not-for-profit form. They also report two instances where com- Comment on Chapters 1 and 2  85 
munity boards turned to large, nearby not-for-profit hospital systems for 
help out of their financial difficulties, rather than rely upon for-profits- 
one assumes despite the likelihood that  they could have  gotten more 
money out of for-profit conversion. These communities effectively put a 
very large price tag on the importance of staying not-for-profit, even when 
doing so still meant a loss of community control. As I write this, there are 
reports of fierce opposition to a Catholic hospital sale to Tenet, despite 
Tenet’s willingness to pay tens of millions more than another potential 
purchaser from a Catholic system. 
Why  are some local and religious communities willing to pay such a 
high price in order to keep their hospitals not-for-profit? These papers put 
researchers in a better position to try to build a framework for answering 
that question, which is just another form of the question of how not-for- 
profits respond differently than for-profits to the economic pressures in 
health care. Answering that question will help us struggle politically with 
the question being asked with increasing frequency and concern: What are 
the social implications of the growth of the for-profit sector in health care? 
Comment on Chapters 1 and 2  James B. Rebitzer 
Nobody knows what really happens when hospitals convert from not-for- 
profit to for-profit status. Do not-for-profit hospitals offer important med- 
ical services to the indigent that for-profit institutions do not adequately 
provide? Do hard-nosed, for-profit managers impose the organizational 
discipline needed to control rising health costs? Do hospital conversions 
transfer the accumulated value of public subsidies to private hospitals at 
less than market rates? These questions make hospital conversions a light- 
ning rod in the ongoing debate over the role of profits in health care. 
The degree of public disquiet over hospital conversions is neatly illus- 
trated by  excerpts from magazines at opposite ends of the political spec- 
trum. At one pole, the conservative Economist writes: 
The travails of America’s largest for-profit hospital chain do not prove 
that profits are bad for health care. It seems only yesterday that Colum- 
bia/HCA Healthcare was acclaimed as a model of how a for-profit com- 
pany could revolutionize health care. Its hard-driving boss, Richard 
Scott, enriched his investors by buying hundreds of hospitals, closing 
lots down and making the remainder far more efficient. Now the firm 
is in the dog house. It denies any wrong-doing, but Mr. Scott has re- 
signed while a posse of investigators looks into allegations that, among 
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other abuses, the company has been overbilling the Federal Govern- 
ment. Could there be clearer evidence, many people are asking, that 
health care and the profit motive do not mix? (Economist, 2 August 
1997) 
The Economist, true to form, answers this last question in the negative. At 
the other pole, the liberal, market-skeptical American Prospect writes 
First it was hospitals and nursing homes, ambulatory care centers and 
health maintenance organizations.  Now it is Blue Cross plans and major 
teaching institutions. In an accelerating rush to the marketplace, many 
of America’s largest health care nonprofits are being converted into 
profit-making organizations. . . . if regulators fail to act, the charitable 
legacy will be lost and more executives of non-profits will become over- 
night millionaires by capturing the assets for themselves and their inves- 
tors. (Bell 1996) 
The papers by Sloan, Taylor, and Conover and by Cutler and Horwitz are 
important because they offer some of the first dispassionate and careful 
assessments of the consequences of hospital conversions. The papers also 
illustrate the power of well-executed case studies to illuminate issues relat- 
ing to organizational governance. 
Cutler and Horwitz examine two hospital conversions. The first conver- 
sion involved Wesley Medical Center in Wichita, and the second involved 
ColumbialHealthOne in Denver. In the Wesley conversion,  Wesley’s assets 
were sold to HCA in  1985, and HCA merged with Columbia to form 
ColumbidHCA in 1993. The Wesley conversion was accompanied by an 
increase in fixed assets due largely to new centers for reproductive health, 
and cardiac and pulmonary rehabilitation. In 1985, Wesley profits were 
about 5 percent. From 1986 to 1990, profits were negative. In 1993, Co- 
lumbia/HCA began managing the hospital, and profits in 1993, 1994, and 
1995 were  10-15  percent annually (compared to 1-2  percent at Wesley’s 
two biggest competitors in Wichita). This excellent performance was due 
to an increase in Medicare revenues and a decrease in costs. Columbia/ 
HCA managed to increase Medicare reimbursement by “unbundling” re- 
habilitation and nursing home services, a practice that may have contrib- 
uted to Columbia’s problems with the federal government. Costs also fell 
because of a 19 percent reduction in length of stay. There is no compelling 
evidence that the for-profit Columbia Wesley Medical Center provided 
fewer services to the poor than not-for-profit Wesley Medical Center. 
The second conversion studied by  Cutler and Horwitz is Columbia/ 
Healthone in Denver. The changes in ownership in this conversion are 
complex. In 1985, PresbyteriadSt. Luke’s sold its assets to for-profit AMI. 
Profits declined consequent to this conversion. The hospital reconverted 
to a not-for-profit in 1991 and merged with another not-for-profit to form 
Healthone  in  1993. Columbia/HCA  and  Healthone  formed a joint, Comment on Chapters 1 and 2  87 
for-profit venture in  1993, Columbia-Healthone. In  1996, Columbia- 
Healthone profits were 7.2 percent, similar to other hospitals in Denver. 
There is some indication in the paper that Columbia improved profits by 
aggressively increasing revenues from the government (although some of 
these tactics may not have been legal), by shortening the length of hospital 
stays, and by cutting staffing and other costs.’ 
Sloan, Taylor, and Conover ask whether hospital conversions were a 
good bargain for the private purchasers. This ambitious paper calculated 
the return on investment and cost of capital for 10 hospital conversions in 
North Carolina and South Carolina. The profitability of conversions was 
estimated using a pooled time-series, cross-section regression with data 
from hospitals in Tennessee. The Tennessee data suggest that hospitals 
converting from not-for-profit to for-profit status had low profits both be- 
fore and after conversion. Furthermore, profit margins did not improve 
much after conversion. Assuming that these Tennessee results also hold 
for North Carolina and South Carolina, the rate of return to conversions 
appears to be low. These researchers conclude that, contrary to the con- 
cerns expressed in  the  American  Prospect,  the acquiring organizations 
likely paid too much for their not-for-profit hospitals. From the Tennessee 
data, Sloan, Taylor, and Conover also conclude that conversion to for- 
profit status had no discernable effect on the provision of  uncompen- 
sated care. 
Put side-by-side, the Cutler and Horwitz report appears inconsistent 
with the findings of Sloan, Taylor, and Conover. The message I take away 
from Cutler and Horwitz is that of savvy Columbia/HCA acquiring not- 
for-profits  and increasing their value by introducing new managerial prac- 
tices. The additional profits, however, may be partly the result of transfer- 
ring value from taxpayers to Columbia shareholders by a clever “gaming” 
of Medicare. In contrast, the message I take away  from Sloan, Taylor, 
and Conover is that of witless for-profits purchasing poorly performing 
hospitals at inflated prices. The taxpayers, in other words, are taking the 
shareholders and their managers to the cleaners. 
Can the results of these two studies be reconciled? Perhaps. It is possible 
that the profit regressions by  Sloan, Taylor, and Conover understate the 
true effect of conversions on profits. Both common sense and the quali- 
tative case studies reported in  these papers indicate that  it takes time 
for conversions to substantially influence hospital management. Unfortu- 
nately, the Tennessee data do not have a long time-series on most conver- 
sions. This problem is confounded by  the specification in Sloan, Taylor, 
and Conover’s regressions. They use a single pre/post dummy variable to 
identify the effect of  conversions. This specification averages early and 
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later effects and may therefore lead to an underestimate of the true effect 
of conversions on profits. 
One way around the problems posed by the short time-series in Tennes- 
see would be to consider different scenarios about the likely long-term 
effect of conversion on profits. In making their purchase, investors must 
have had expectations regarding the level of profitability needed to make 
money on the new for-profit hospital. For example, most conversions in- 
volved hospitals with below-average profits. Would the conversions look 
like good investments if investors believed that their hospital would even- 
tually attain average industry profit rates? We  might learn more about 
these expectations if Sloan, Taylor, and Conover used their simulations to 
evaluate a variety of counterfactual assumptions about long-term profit 
performance. What is the most conservative set of assumptions about fu- 
ture profits required to make the conversion look like a good deal? Do 
these conservative profit assumptions entail reasonable or unreasonable 
expectations? 
Sloan, Taylor, and Conover’s profit estimates may also understate the 
true return on a conversion investment if  the market value of the invest- 
ment is not reflected in current profits. For example, of all the conversions 
these  researchers studied, the  Hilton  Head  conversion  lost  the  most 
money, but as they note, Hilton Head was located next door to a large, yet- 
to-be built, retirement community. The prospective value of this locational 
advantage is not captured in the profit projections of Sloan, Taylor, and 
Conover, but it surely should play a role in determining the hospital’s pur- 
chase price. 
Another way to reconcile Cutler and Horwitz with Sloan, Taylor, and 
Conover is to argue that Columbia/HCA is not representative of the for- 
profit hospital industry. There is some support for this in Sloan, Taylor, 
and Conover’s sample. The ColumbidHCA conversion involving Provi- 
dence hospital was the only not-for-profit conversion in the North Caro- 
lina and South Carolina sample with a positive rate of return. If Colum- 
bia/HCA is special, we  cannot at present tell whether it is because they 
are especially good at managing costs or especially good at gaming the re- 
imbursement  system. Either way, the hypothesis that Columbia/HCA per- 
formance is unique is worth further investigation. 
If the conclusions drawn by Sloan, Taylor, and Conover are correct and 
for-profit hospitals do overpay for not-for-profits, we  need to know why. 
One explanation might be a “winner’s curse.” This term describes a com- 
petitive environment in which the winning bidders are those that systemat- 
ically overestimate the value of the assets they are purchasing. A closely 
related phenomenon of “self-serving biases’’ has been observed to take 
place in negotiations. Even experienced lawyers have a tendency to inter- 
pret the facts of a case in a light most favorable to their interests (Babcock 
et al. 1995). If hospitals do not learn to overcome the asymmetric infor- Comment on Chapters 1 and 2  89 
mation and perceptual biases that sustain a “winner’s curse,” then we  can 
anticipate that the market for not-for-profits will eventually disappear. 
Alternatively, it may  be that for-profit hospitals made bad purchases 
because those making the purchasing decisions were otherwise compen- 
sated for agreeing to the deal. Although this sort of private inurement is 
illegal, there is  some scattered evidence that it does play a role in some 
hospital conversions (Kuttner 1996). For example, in Dickson, Tennessee, 
where Goodlark Hospital was sold in  1995, a local state representative 
was both the lawyer for Goodlark, a trustee of Goodlark, and the head of 
the new foundation created with the proceeds of the hospital’s sale (Kut- 
tner 1996). 
The opportunity for private inurement as well as the possibility of un- 
compensated transfers of wealth from public charities to private investors 
has caused some states to examine hospital conversions closely. In Massa- 
chusetts and California, for example, the public and the state attorneys 
general are very  involved  in  overseeing hospital  conversions. In  other 
states, however,  conversions take place with much less public scrutiny 
(Kuttner  1996). We  might learn a good deal more about conversions by 
investigating how different regulatory environments influence the terms of 
the deals that emerge. In the process, we would also learn valuable lessons 
about the role that profits play in the delivery of health care services. 
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